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Previous studies examining the relationship between uncertainty and vertical integration have
produced a conflicting set of results. To clarify this puzzle we drew on the literature to
conceptualize three distinct forms of uncertainty—primary, competitive, and supplier—and
hypothesized that each had a different effect on vertical integration. The hypotheses were tested
using experimental data collected from 308 managers. Consistent with our prediction of
differential effects, we found that primary and competitive uncertainty were negatively associated
with the decision to vertically integrate, but supplier uncertainty was positively related to the
vertical integration decision. No interaction effects were found. Implications for theory and
research are suggested. 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Strat. Mgmt. J.,Vol. 19, 1–23 (1998)
The concept of uncertainty has long been a cen-
tral component of a number of theories of organi-
zation and strategy. March and Simon (1958)
identified uncertainty as a key variable in
explaining organizational behavior. Thompson
(1967) suggested that an organization’s primary
task is coping with the uncertain contingencies
of the environment, particularly those of the task
environment (Dill, 1962). Pfeffer and Salancik’s
(1978) resource dependency theory suggests that
organizations structure their external relationships
in response to the uncertainty resulting from
dependence on elements of the environment.
Other organizational researchers have argued that
organizations structure themselves internally in
response to environmental uncertainty (Burns and
Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).
Researchers in strategic management also have
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considered uncertainty to be a major factor affect-
ing key strategic decisions (Porter, 1980). A con-
siderable stream of research drawing on trans-
action cost theory emphasizes the influence of
uncertainty on decisions concerning the scope of
the firm, specifically the decision to vertically
integrate (e.g., Williamson, 1975; Walker and
Weber, 1984, 1987).
Notwithstanding this interest, however, the na-
ture of the relationship between uncertainty and
vertical integration has proved to be somewhat of
a theoretical and empirical puzzle. Specifically,
findings from studies examining the effects of
uncertainty on vertical integration appear to contra-
dict one another. For example, studies grounded
in transaction cost theory by John and Weitz
(1988), Anderson (1985), and Walker and Weber
(1984, 1987) provide empirical support for the
proposition that vertical integration is an efficient
response to environmental uncertainty. In contrast,
empirical work grounded in strategic management
theory (e.g., Porter, 1980) suggests that firms fac-
ing uncertainty require greater flexibility and has
shown that uncertainty results in alowered rather
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than an increased degree of vertical integration
(Harrigan, 1985). Scholarly understanding of the
relationship between uncertainty and firm scope is
complicated further by other empirical findings.
For example, Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt (1986)
found that the degree of vertical integration
decreased with increasedtechnologicaluncertainty,
thereby relating a specific component of uncer-
tainty to the decision about firm scope.
One plausible explanation to account for the
contradictory findings noted above may hinge on
the source or the type of uncertainty being exam-
ined. More specifically, given that uncertainty
may arise from a number of sources or may be
characterized along a number of dimensions, it
is possible thatdifferent sources or dimensions of
uncertainty havedifferent implications for vertical
integration. In fact, some theoretical work has
emphasized the pitfalls of viewing uncertainty as
a unidimensional construct (e.g., Milliken, 1987;
Yasai-Ardekani, 1986) rather than one that is
complex, multidimensional, and differentiated.
However, the implications of this line of thinking
have not been explored fully. Taken together,
there are indications that we need to consider the
multidimensionality of the uncertainty construct
and the simultaneous effects of its component
parts on vertical integrationin order to resolve
contradictory empirical results regarding the na-
ture of this relationship.
Given the prominence of the uncertainty con-
struct to theory and research in strategic man-
agement, organization economics, and organi-
zational theory generally, these are important
theoretical and empirical tasks. Therefore, the main
objective of this study is to empirically differen-
tiate between uncertainty arising from three
sources—which we label primary, competitive,
and supplier uncertainty—and examine their simul-
taneous influence on the vertical integration
decision. Further, the study also takes a prelimi-
nary step toward understanding the governance
decision process by examining the extent to which
decisions about vertical scope are affected by the
uncertainty-related information managers take into
account. Hypotheses are tested on 308 managers
using a randomized experimental design. The
results support the basic thesis of this research
that different sources of uncertainty have distinct
effects on the decision to vertically integrate.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
The next section discusses the theory and prior
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research pertaining to the construct of uncertainty
and its relationship with vertical integration, the
second section more fully develops the hypoth-
eses, and the third section discusses the experi-
mental method utilized in the study. In the pen-
ultimate section, we present the results of the
research. The final section presents a discussion
and includes the limitations and implications of
the findings for theory and research.
PRIOR RESEARCH AND THEORY
Environmental uncertainty
Uncertainty has been an important construct in a
number of fields, including organization theory,
marketing, and strategic management. In the
organization theory literature, Thompson postu-
lated that ‘[u]ncertainty appears as the funda-
mental problem for complex organizations’
(1967: 159) and that organizations respond to
uncertainty in the environment by ‘buffering’
their ‘technical core’ from its effects. A number
of studies have shown that perceived environmen-
tal uncertainty exerts a considerable influence on
organizational structures and processes (Huber,
O’Connell, and Cummings, 1975; Huber and
Daft, 1987). Further, while some of the previous
empirical research examining perceived environ-
mental uncertainty has operationalized uncertainty
as a unidimensional construct, increasingly
researchers question this assumption (Milliken,
1987; Tosi and Slocum, 1984; Yasai-Ardekani,
1986). Milliken (1987), for example, suggests
that uncertainty is multidimensional and develops
a typology of uncertainty dimensions as follows:
state uncertainty, the inability to assign prob-
abilities to states of nature;effect uncertainty, a
ack of knowledge about cause–effect relation-
ships, in particular about how states of nature
will affect the organization; andresponseuncer-
tainty, an inability to predict the outcomes of
decisions. While these distinctions are useful, our
study has another focus—that of capturing the
uncertainty aboutdifferent aspectsof the environ-
ment (see Tosi and Slocum, 1984).
A considerable body of work in the marketing
literature also has examined uncertainty and its
consequences related to the structural properties
of organizations. Much of this work, grounded in
transaction cost analysis, explores uncertainty and
its influence on vertical integration in distribution
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channels. Most notable are studies by John and
Weitz (1988), Heide and John (1990), and Heide
and Stump (1995) who include volume and
behavioral uncertainty in their studies and find
that both types of uncertainty invariably exhibit
a positive relationship with forward integration
into distribution. Heide and John (1990) also
investigate technological uncertainty and find a
negative relationship with relationship continuity.
Questions related to uncertainty and its effects
on firm scope have long intrigued scholars in
strategic management as well. As noted earlier,
studies in strategic management have examined
the link between uncertainty and vertical
integration—although findings in this regard are
contradictory. In addition, researchers in strategic
management have begun to expand research in
this area by examining how changes in firm scope
subsequently affect different types of uncertainty.
For example, Helfat and Teece (1987) examine
the proposition that one outcome of vertical inte-
gration is a reduction in both secondary and
behavioral uncertainty. Using a sample of firms
which have undergone vertical mergers, they
compare the pre- and postmerger measures of
systematic risk (betas) for each of the firms with
those of a control group of firms which havenot
experienced vertical mergers. As expected, Helfat
and Teece indeed find that firms exhibit lowered
risk after a vertical merger.
In contrast to the work of Helfat and Teece, the
study presented here takes a different approach to
the question of uncertainty and vertical inte-
gration. First, we conceptualize and measure
uncertainty in perceptual terms rather than as
systematic risk (beta). Second, and more
importantly, we consider uncertainty as ante-
cedent to the decision to vertically integrate,
rather than examining thepost factoreduction in
risk as a consequence of vertical integration.
Moreover, we explicitly consider the additional
effect of primary uncertainty on the decision to
vertically integrate. In the following paragraphs
we consolidate the conceptualization of uncer-
tainty in the strategic management and transaction
cost literatures to arrive at a clearer definition of
the different dimensions of uncertainty.
Toward a clearer definition and
operationalization of uncertainty types
Early transaction cost literature (Williamson,
1975) did not distinguish between different forms
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of uncertainty. In more recent transaction cost
and strategic management literature, however, the
construct of uncertainty has been disaggregated
(Williamson, 1985: 56–59), a trend consistent
with recent developments in organizational
theory. In the present study, we draw on William-
son (1985) to develop a typology of three forms
of uncertainty (primary, competitive, and
supplier). Williamson himself builds on Koop-
mans (1957) who distinguished between primary
and secondary uncertainty as follows:primary
uncertainty reflects a lack of knowledge about
states of nature, such as the uncertainty regarding
natural events, whereas secondary uncertainty
reflects a lack of knowledge about the actions of
other economic actors. Koopmans argues that
both forms of uncertainty affect a firm’s invest-
ment decisions. Thus, in contrast to Milliken’s
(1987) conceptualization which focuses on igno-
rance about three stages of a cause–effect chain,
primary and secondary uncertainty specifically
refer to the uncertainty arising from different
ectors of the environment that have a bearing
on firms’ decisions regarding their boundaries.
More specifically, primary uncertainty reflects
the uncertainty arising from exogenous sources,
such as natural events, from changes in prefer-
ences, as well as from regulatory changes, such as
those involving standards or tariffs. Thus, primary
uncertainty appears to subsume technological
uncertainty, or the uncertainty arising from
changes in technology due to new inventions or
discoveries. Primary uncertainty also corresponds
closely tostateuncertainty as described by Milli-
ken (1987), in that both refer to the lack of
knowledge about various states of nature. As
noted earlier, secondary uncertainty refers to the
uncertainty about the actions of other economic
actors generally.
Williamson (1985) describes both primary and
secondary uncertainty as ‘innocent’ and ‘non-
strategic’ forms of uncertainty and distinguishes
them from behavioral uncertainty, the deliberate
nondisclosure of information or the strategic mis-
representation of information by economic agents.
Williamson contends that the behavioral type of
uncertainty is the key form of uncertainty relevant
to the transaction context. Behavioral uncertainty
arises from the difficulty in predicting the actions
of other relevant actors, particularly in view of
the potential for opportunistic behavior.
Since our focus in this study is on dis-
tinguishing between different forms of uncertainty
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which arise from the differentsources that are
relevant to decisions about firm scope, we believe
that uncertainty can be usefully classified aspri-
mary, competitive, and supplier uncertainty. We
take this approach to classifying forms of uncer-
tainty because we believe that strategic decisions
about firm scope are critically affected both by
exogenous events and by the actions of competi-
tors, suppliers, and buyers. This approach accords
well with a strategic management perspective
which views the actions of these groups, as well
as the macroenvironment, as important for stra-
tegic analysis (Porter, 1980). Further, we believe
that it is useful to make these distinctions because
the effects on vertical scope from the uncertainty
arising from these different sources are not likely
to be identical, as previous research has indicated.
In defining primary uncertainty, we follow
Koopmans (1957) and Williamson (1985), and
consider this form of uncertainty as relating to
exogenous sources, as discussed earlier. Competi-
tive and supplier uncertainty require explanation.
We definecompetitive uncertaintyas the uncer-
tainty arising from the actions of potential or
actual competitors, which may be either ‘inno-
cent’ or ‘strategic’. Competitive uncertainty
derives from moves or signals by economic actors
in current or future competition with the focal
firm, which may be ‘noisy’ and difficult to grasp
precisely (Porter, 1980). Moves by potential new
entrants, or of firms making substitutes, in
addition to those of existing competitors in an
industry, may have a major influence on a focal
firm’s vertical scope decisions. The uncertainty
engendered by the actions of potential or actual
competitors may be deliberate, stemming from
strategic motivations, such as the uncertainty cre-
ated from product preannouncements (Farrell and
Saloner, 1986). On the other hand, competitive
uncertainty may arise innocently from a lack of
competitor intelligence or awareness about the
prospective actions of competitor firms.
Supplier uncertaintyis the behavioral uncer-
tainty arising from the (strategic) actions of the
exchange partner firm. Behavioral uncertainty
arises from the possibility ofex anteor ex post
opportunism on the part of the exchange partner
firm. Williamson (1975) refers to behavioral
uncertainty as ‘self-interest seeking with guile’
and includes in the concept the use of self-
disbelieved statements and misinformation with
the intention of profiting at the expense of the
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exchange partner. In sum, we propose that sup-
plier uncertainty is ‘strategic’ in Williamson’s
(1985) terms and therefore of a behavioral nature.
Further, this form of uncertainty relates speci-
fically to possible opportunism by either the
upstream or the downstream exchange partner.1
Figure 1 shows the relationship between pri-
mary, competitive, and supplier uncertainty and
their effects on an organization.
Uncertainty and vertical integration
The transaction cost literature (Williamson, 1975,
1985) suggests that governance structures evolve
out of the uncertain consequences of investments
in transaction-specific assets. Uncertainty is theo-
rized to increase the likelihood that opportunistic
appropriation of quasi-rents from transaction-
specific assets may take place (Klein, Crawford,
and Alchian, 1978), thereby increasing transaction
costs of exchange. In order to limit the extent of
potential opportunism, firms are likely to integrate
the transaction into a hierarchy, where opportun-
ism is controlled by fiat (Williamson, 1975).
Consequently, vertical integration is a solution to
the problem of high uncertainty.
An opposing line of argument flows from the
empirical work of other scholars in the field.
Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt (1986), for example,
argue that environmental uncertainty, more speci-
fically the uncertainty in technological conditions,
is likely to discouragevertical integration due to
the lowered profits in such industries. Profits are
argued to be lower since innovations occur more
rapidly, and capital losses are greater. Presum-
ably, it is the unanticipated nature of the inno-
vations that results in lower profits for firms.
With lower profits, there is a reduction in the
incentives to bargain, and fewer transaction costs
to save. As a result, there are reduced incentives
to integrate. Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt’s
empirical findings support the proposition that
vertical integration is lower when technological
change is high, particularly when the degree of
competition is also high. Balakrishnan and Wer-
1 Strictly, we should label this form of supply chain uncer-
tainty ‘supplier–customer uncertainty,’ but we prefer to use
the term ‘supplier uncertainty’ both for reasons of simplicity
and because the discussion in Williamson’s work, for example
(1975) and (1985), typically focuses on the supplier.
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Figure 1. Sources of uncertainty
nerfelt also briefly note the distinction between
demand uncertainty and technological uncertainty.
Harrigan (1985) and Porter (1980) relate
environmental uncertainty to vertical integration
using a somewhat different logic. Their arguments
rest on the notion that environmental uncertainty,
more specifically the uncertainty in demand and
technological conditions, is likely todiscourage
vertical integration due to the strategic inflexi-
bility that may accompany vertical integration. In
particular, as changes take place in technological
conditions, a firm’s strategy, for example with
respect to sources of supply, may also need to
change in response. Vertical integration may con-
strain the ability of a firm to alter strategy in
such conditions due to the firm’s commitment to
a now-obsolete technology.
Uncertainty and asset specificity
Although uncertainty is a key variable affecting
strategic decisions about firm boundaries, other
factors may moderate its effects. Specifically,
transaction cost theory and research have empha-
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sized that asset specificity will conditionally affect
vertical integration decisions (Walker and Weber,
1984; Williamson, 1985). Under conditions of
high asset specificity, uncertainty will be a more
ignificant determinant of vertical integration
because both the cost and the possibilities of
hold-up from opportunistic behavior are higher.
Without asset specificity, the rationale for vertical
integration would simply not exist, as there would
be no assets at risk and therefore in need of
protection (by means of vertical integration) from
possible opportunism. In the next section, we
develop hypotheses linking forms of uncertainty
to vertical integration assuming abackground
condition of asset specificity; in other words, by
manipulating experimental conditions tokeep
asset specificity moderate, but constant. Given
the importance of asset specificity to the vertical
integration decision, a question may well be
raised about the appropriateness of empirically
examining the relationship between uncertainty
and vertical integration without explicitly includ-
ing asset specificity in the analysis. Before pro-
posing hypotheses, we elaborate briefly on our
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rationale for dealing with asset specificity in
this way.
Our approach was driven by two basic ideas.
First, asset specificity has been successfully stud-
ied and its effects on vertical integration are well
documented in the literature. Second, a number
of empirical treatments in the transaction cost
tradition, including studies by Balakrishnan and
Wernerfelt (1986), John and Weitz (1988), and
Heide and John (1990), have shown that uncer-
tainty exerts an effect on vertical integration,
or on its surrogates, quite independent of asset
specificity. Given this, we believed a fruitful area
of inquiry was to focus onuncertainty while
controlling for asset specificitybecause the effects
of asset specificity have been well established in
the empirical literature, and because uncertainty
is likely to have independent effects on vertical
integration. As is normal scientific practice, we
undertake to study a piece of the puzzle and
extend research by concentrating on resolving the
ambiguity in the literature by explicitly recogniz-
ing different types of uncertainty and examining
their simultaneous effects on the vertical scope
decision.
HYPOTHESES
As noted earlier, primary uncertainty arises from
a profound lack of knowledge of the states of
nature. Primary uncertainty includes the uncertain
outcomes of natural events, changes in con-
sumers’ tastes and preferences, technological
shifts, and other exogenous changes in the
broader environment. Firms have to adapt to
changes in the environment. However, as the
number of possible changes increases, the number
of possible unforeseen contingencies that may
affect contracts between firms increases too.
Bounded rationality precludes the writing of com-
pletely contingent contracts (Williamson, 1985),
and contracts will tend to become less complete
in more uncertain environments. Due to ‘noncon-
vergent expectations’ (Malmgren, 1961), firms
will read and react to the same information in
the broader environment differently, giving rise
to the possibility of suboptimized outcomes
through the lack of coordination.
Moreover, incomplete contracts create
increased costs because negotiation and bar-
gaining are required to resolve the disputes that
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arise as unforeseen contingencies increase. These
disputes concern the distribution of the appropri-
able quasi-rents (Kleinet al., 1978), that are
generated by the transaction-specific assets the
exchange partners have dedicated to the relation-
ship. Under such conditions hierarchical coordi-
nation through vertical integration is suggested
because unified ownership within a hierarchy
allows superior coordination. Further, fiat and
related incentive structures may limit the extent
of costly bargaining over the rents (Williamson,
1985, 1993). Thus, firms will tend to vertically
integrate transactions around which high primary
uncertainty exists. Accordingly,
Hypothesis 1: Primary uncertainty will be
positively associated with decisions to verti-
cally integrate.
In contrast to the above reasoning, an alternative
argument consistent with strategic management
research (Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt, 1986)
suggests that high levels of primary uncertainty—
which includes exogenous technological
uncertainty—may act in theopposite direction
with regard to vertical integration. As discussed
earlier, changing technological conditions imply
a high rate of obsolescence. Under uncertain tech-
nological conditions, the costs of frequent obso-
lescence may result in lower profits, reducing the
potential savings in transaction costs from vertical
tegration. This line of reasoning suggests that
firms will opt against vertical integration when
technological conditions are perceived to be
changing rapidly. Thus, a plausible alternative
hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1a: Primary uncertainty will be
negatively associated with decisions to verti-
cally integrate.
The notion of competitive uncertainty, as dis-
cussed earlier, refers to the actions of other com-
petitors which have a bearing on the vertical
cope decisions of a focal firm. These actions
may be either ‘innocent’ or ‘strategic’
(deliberately deceitful or misrepresented). Not-
withstanding this distinction, competitive uncer-
tainty is likely to lead to an increase in the
contingencies of the competitive marketplace,
thereby increasing the transaction costs of
exchange in vertical contractual relationships
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between firms. As discussed above, for both coor-
dination and bargaining reasons vertical inte-
gration may be the efficient governance choice
under such conditions because it economizes on
transaction costs (Williamson, 1975). More speci-
fically, as the possibility of strategic action by
competitors increases, so does the likelihood of
vertical integration. Consequently we suggest:
Hypothesis 2: Competitive uncertainty will be
positively associated with decisions to verti-
cally integrate.
The rationale linking supplier uncertainty to verti-
cal integration differs from the logic presented
above for primary and competitive uncertainty.
Supplier uncertainty arises from the uncertainty
about the behaviors of the vertical partner in the
transaction. Williamson views behavioral uncer-
tainty as ‘strategic non-disclosure, disguise, or
distortion of information’ (1985: 57), and such
opportunistic behavior may occur bothex ante
andex post. Further, while behavioral uncertainty
may be salient depending on the ‘particulars of
the contract... [e]ven knowledge of the particulars
. . . does not preclude surprises’ (1985: 58). In
effect behavioral uncertainty can be viewed inde-
pendently of the unspecified contingencies in the
contract. Behavioral uncertainty is likely to be
higher or lower when dealing with ‘trader[s] . . .
from one part of the opportunism distribution’
than the other (1985: 58), but even ‘screening for
trustworthiness’ does not eliminate uncertainty
regarding the behavior of an exchange partner.
Supplier uncertainty profoundly affects the
governance efficiency of the relationship. In parti-
cular, uncertainty regarding the partner’s possible
opportunism will lower incentives to invest in
transaction-specific assets that may be committed
to the relationship. In order to ensure the optimal
level of investment in such assets, vertical inte-
gration of the transaction is suggested. Alterna-
tively, vertical integration implies the use of fiat
and unified governance to reduce incentives for
the appropriation of quasi-rents (Kleinet al.,
1978) that are generated by transaction-specific
assets, making such a governance form the
efficient choice. Accordingly, we propose:
Hypothesis 3: Supplier uncertainty will be
positively associated with decisions to verti-
cally integrate.
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While supplier uncertainty relates to the
behavioral uncertainty about the actions of verti-
cal partners and its effects on vertical integration,
a case may also be made for themoderating
effects of primary and competitive uncertainty
with supplier uncertainty on vertical integration.
The reasoning behind these predictions is as fol-
lows. Supplier uncertainty exists due to the possi-
bility of opportunistic behavior on the part of the
supplier. However, given incomplete contracts,
the opportunities for nondisclosure of information
and other strategic misrepresentation (Williamson,
1985) increase with the number and degree of
contingencies in the exchange relationship. Such
contingencies may arise due to exogenous events
taking place in the external environment (primary
uncertainty) or due to more proximate events
such as changes in supply due to competitive
actions (competitive uncertainty). When primary
and competitive uncertainty are higher, the num-
ber of contingencies rises too. Accordingly, we
propose that the effects of supplier uncertainty
on vertical integration are even stronger when
supplier uncertainty operates in conjunction with
primary and competitive uncertainty. Further,
competitive uncertainty is likely to be exacerbated
in the face of primary uncertainty. The following
hypotheses capture the two-way and three-way
interaction effects implied in the foregoing:
Hypothesis 4a: Primary uncertainty will
moderate the relationship between supplier
uncertainty and the decision to vertically inte-
grate.
Hypothesis 4b: Primary uncertainty will
moderate the relationship between competitive
uncertainty and the decision to vertically inte-
grate.
Hypothesis 4c: Competitive uncertainty will
moderate the relationship between supplier
uncertainty and the decision to vertically inte-
grate.
Hypothesis 4d: Primary uncertainty and com-
petitive uncertainty will moderate the relation-
ship between supplier uncertainty and the
decision to vertically integrate.
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Information use
The literature on strategic decision-making sug-
gests that strategic decision effectiveness is
shaped by both environmental factors and
decision processes. Although some scholars argue
that environmental constraints determine choices
and lessen the importance of choice processes
(e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), other scholars
argue that managers retain a substantial degree
of control over strategic choices even in the
context of constraints (e.g., Child, 1972). The
latter position is strengthened by the observation
that ‘some managers make very poor strategic
choices, with devastating consequences for their
firms, while others in very similar circumstances
make much better choices’ (Dean and Sharfman,
1996: 369). The collection of information relevant
to the decision and reliance upon analysis of this
information in making the choice is central to
effective decision processes (Dean and Sharfman,
1993). Yet, studies employing the transaction cost
paradigm have paid relatively little attention to
the kinds of environmental information decision-
makers use in making vertical integration
decisions.
Research has shown that information is likely
to have an instrumental effect on actual decisions
(Bourgeois, 1985; Sabatier, 1978). Presumably,
better decisions are a consequence of more exten-
sive information collection which leads to more
accurate perceptions of environmental conditions
(Sutcliffe, 1994) and better firm performance
(Bourgeois, 1985). Of course, assessing the con-
text to determine how best to adapt the organi-
zation to meet contextual demands or constraints
is not easy. Managers have to wade into a sea
of ambiguous, conflicting, and contradictory
information and decide what to pay attention to
and what to ignore. An important implication of
this research stream of relevance to the present
study is that the extent to which managers take
relevantcontextual information into account may
moderate the relationship between the level of
uncertainty and the vertical integration decision.
This leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 5a: The association between pri-
mary uncertainty and decision to vertically
integrate is moderated by the extent to which
decision-makers take primary uncertainty
information into account.
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Hypothesis 5b: The association between com-
petitive uncertainty and decision to vertically
integrate is moderated by the extent to which
decision-makers take competitive uncertainty
information into account.
Hypothesis 5c: The association between sup-
plier uncertainty and decision to vertically
integrate is moderated by the extent to which




The nature of the research questions in this study
dictated that we use a methodology that would
allow us to control the information-processing
context. Thus, data was gathered through the use
of written decision scenarios using an experi-
mental methodology. Although some scholars
argue against experimental research in strategic
management, the usefulness of an experimental
decision-based perspective has been demonstrated
by a number of strategic process investigators
(Bower, 1970; Fredrickson, 1984; Mintzberg,
1978; Thomas and McDaniel, 1990) and is con-
sidered a promising method for enhancing under-
standing of competitive strategic decision-making
(Schwenk, 1995: 489). In our study, participants
read a decision scenario that depicted a hypotheti-
cal situation in which a firm must decide whether
to vertically integrate or outsource part of its
operations. The scenario included information in
regard to the three forms of uncertainty. Inform-
ants then were asked to give an assessment
whether the firm should vertically integrate or
outsource. In addition, participants were asked to
respond to Likert-type questions to describe the
extent to which they used nine information items
contained in the case scenario in making their
decision. The research materials contained
detailed instructions in the self-administration of
the research instruments.
Instruments
The scenarios provided detailed information about
a hypothetical firm in the printing industry. One
criterion for industry selection was an industry
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with a large number of firms—since we wished
to create realistic scenarios while not wanting
respondents to make comparisons with real-life
firms. The printing industry met this criterion
well. Further, we were looking for a manufactur-
ing industry in which the customization of physi-
cal equipment to meet customers’ needs (asset
specificity) was a plausible condition. As
explained earlier, the level of asset specificity
was held constant in all the decision scenarios
and was designed to be moderately high.
Before developing the scenarios, we conducted
an extensive search for information about the
printing industry to identify specific industry
characteristics and to identify typical problems
faced by firms within the printing industry. Indus-
try issues were worked into scenarios, each four
pages long, which included information about the
firm, its background and performance history, the
current decision situation, and information about
the three types of uncertainty under investigation
in this study (see Appendix 1 for a sample
scenario).
The independent variables were manipulated
by inserting in the cases one set of alternative
paragraphs describing primary uncertainty (either
high or low), one of two alternative paragraphs
describing competitive uncertainty (either high
or low), and one set of alternative paragraphs
describing supplier uncertainty (either high or
low) (see Appendix 2). Therefore, eight combi-
nations of conditions were possible, resulting in
eight different decision scenarios.
In order to refine the decision scenarios and to
ensure that the manipulations were successful,
an extensive pilot test of the instruments was
conducted. Evening graduate business students
in a large Midwestern university were asked to
participate in the pilot study. Pilot study parti-
cipants were also asked to evaluate the length of
the instrument, the clarity of the questions, and
to provide feedback in regard to the meaning-
fulness of the language used. Changes were made
to strengthen the manipulations based on the par-
ticipants’ feedback and analysis of the pretest
data.
Measures
After participants read a case that contained one
of the eight possible combinations of the three
types of uncertainty, they responded to a series
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of 7-point Likert-type scaled questions. The ques-
tions were used to create the vertical integration
dependent measure and the uncertainty infor-
mation use independent measures.
Dependent measure
The decision tovertically integratewas measured
with a two-item scale (alpha= 0.94) that asked
participants to indicate the extent to which they
agreed or disagreed with the two following state-
ments: ‘Vegas Press should outsource its finishing
operations’ (reverse coded), and ‘Vegas Press
should expand its in-house finishing operations.’
Items were averaged to create a variable score
since there was no theoretical grounding for using
weighted averages in the calculation.
Independent measures
Dummy variables were created to reflect the
experimental levels ofprimary, competitive, and
supplier uncertainty(1 = low, 2 = high). The nine
information items used to construct each of the
case scenarios were presented to the participants,
who were asked to indicate the extent to which
they would use each piece of information in
making their decision. Information items in the
case scenario provided the basis for three meas-
ures of information usage. The extent to which
participants tookprimary uncertainty information
into account in making their decision was meas-
ured with five items that were averaged to create
a variable score (Cronbach alpha= 0.71). The
degree to which participants usedinformation
about competitive uncertaintyin making their
decision was assessed with one item. The extent
to which participants tooksupplier uncertainty
information into account in making their decision
was measured with three items that were averaged
to create a variable score (Cronbach alpha=
0.68).
Control variables
Several variables were used as controls in the
analyses, including: the age of the participants,
the gender of the participants, and total years of
work experience. Individual characteristics were
included in the models consonant with research
suggesting that perceived environmental un-
certainty is related to personal characteristics
(Downey, Hellriegel, and Slocum, 1977).
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Manipulation checks
The final questions were manipulation checks.
Subjects were asked to complete the manipulation
questions after they had completed the other study
questions and sealed the case and questions in
an envelope. There were six questions covering
manipulation checks. For example, the first ques-
tion stated that ‘[t]he certainty of economic
recovery is . . .’ and provided a response con-
tinuum from 1 (highly certain) to 7 (highly
uncertain). Each of the eight case scenarios con-
tained the same questions.
Subjects and procedures
Subjects in this study were 308 students enrolled
in graduate-level business administration classes,
specifically core strategic management and
organizational theory/behavior courses. All sub-
jects were executives or managers working full
time. Many were enrolled with the express inten-
tion of maintaining or enhancing current business
knowledge and management competencies; some
were enrolled at night to complete a long-term
course of study for the MBA degree. Further,
many were senior-level executives. For example,
our sample included the chief financial officer of
a large agricultural trading company, the senior
vice president for human resources for a large
institutional investment firm, a high-level execu-
tive in a U.S. government lending institution, and
the chief financial officer of a large manufacturing
firm. Consequently, the average subject profile in
our sample did not match the typical profile of
an MBA student both in terms of age and experi-
ence levels. All subjects had undergraduate
degrees; half of the subjects were older than 28.9
years of age, half of the subjects had more than
6.13 years of work experience (3.04 years work
experience in their current firm); 36 percent were
women, 64 percent men.
The use of laboratory research in strategic man-
agement is often criticized on the grounds that
subjects (often undergraduate college students)
differ greatly from the managers and other pro-
fessionals to whom the results may be gen-
eralized. Although speculative (we have no data
regarding the population to which the results
might be generalized), the average profile of the
subjects in the study reported here may be more
representative of the population to which the
results will be generalized than is typical of most
lab studies. Further, we believe that the sample
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is sufficient to test the theory for the following
reasons. First, the subjects in the sample have
considerable work experience and many of them
are making high-level decisions. While they sin-
gle-handedly may not be making vertical inte-
gration decisions, it is likely that they are
involved in such decision-making processes. This
consideration is especially valid since it is likely
that decisions of the type studied here would be
made by a team of decision-makers rather than
a single decision-maker. Second, we suggest that
the issue is not so much one of whether the
sample includes individuals who specifically make
vertical integration decisions (provided such a
population could be identified), but that the sam-
ple include knowledgeable and experienced sub-
jects who can apply their knowledge and expertise
to the choice situation at hand. Since over half
of our subjects exceeded 6 years of work experi-
ence, we consider them to have sufficient experi-
ence to address the issues at hand.
The study took place during a 3-week period
during the winter quarter. In all cases, students
were given at least an hour (sometimes more) to
complete the experiment. Our pilot test indicated
that the average time to complete the study
materials was about 30–40 minutes. Case con-
ditions were randomly distributed across individ-
uals. An effort was made to ensure that within
each section there were equal numbers of the
eight case-and-condition combinations. We also
tried to ensure, to the extent possible, that the
total number of participants in each case condition
cell was equal. Final cell sizes ranged between
36 and 42.
Analyses
Preliminary analyses were conducted: manipu-
lation checks and tests to determine whether the
respondents’ age, total years experience, and gen-
der varied across the eight experimental con-
ditions. We carried out manipulation checks on
the three uncertainty conditions using ANOVA.
The results indicated that participants correctly
understood the level of each of the three types
of uncertainty (primary uncertainty,F = 7.82,
p , 0.0001; competitive uncertainty,F = 1.92,
p , 0.06; supplier uncertainty, F = 10.51,
p , 0.0001). We also used ANOVA to test for
differences in the respondents’ ages across con-
ditions and no significant differences were found
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(F = 1.41, n.s.). No systematic differences were
found across experimental conditions for total
experience (F = 1.37, n.s.) or gender (F = 0.71,
n.s.).
The hypotheses were tested using hierarchical
regression analysis. The vertical integration
dependent variable was regressed on dummy vari-
ables representing the three uncertainty con-
ditions, the four interactions between the levels
of uncertainty, the three continuous measures of
information usage, the interactions between the
levels of uncertainty and the measures of infor-
mation use, and the three control variables. We
tested the increment inR2 yielded by the addition
of each of these blocks of variables. If the
increment inR2 was significant, the coefficients
were examined to determine whether the coef-
ficients conformed to the hypotheses.
RESULTS
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and corre-
lations between all variables included in the
study. The hierarchical regression results are
presented in Table 2. The percentage of variance
explained in the model is 0.33 (adj.R2 = 0.30).
Overall, we find main effects for uncertainty sta-
tistically significant, though the interactions
between them were not. In addition, two of the
three interaction effects for the information use
and the uncertainty conditions were statistically
significant. A discussion of the support, or the
lack thereof, for the hypotheses follows.
Hypothesis 1 proposed that primary uncertainty
would be significantly and positively related to
the decision to vertically integrate, while Hypoth-
esis 1a proposed the opposite. The results
presented in Table 2 providesupportfor Hypoth-
esis 1a and indicate that primary uncertainty is
associatednegativelywith decisions to vertically
integrate. The unstandardized coefficient for the
variable is−0.39 (p , 0.01).
Hypothesis 2 argued that competitive uncer-
tainty is positively associated with vertical inte-
gration decisions. As the data in Table 2 show,
competitive uncertainty wasnegatively and sig-
nificantly related to vertical integration thereby
providing no support for Hypothesis 2. The
unstandardized coefficient for the variable is
−0.32 (p , 0.05).
Hypothesis 3 suggested that supplier uncer-
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tainty is positively associated with vertical inte-
gration. The findingssupportedthis hypothesis as
shown in Table 2. The unstandardized coefficient
is 0.53 (p , 0.01).
Hypotheses 4a, 4b, 4c and 4d proposed inter-
action effects between primary, competitive, and
supplier uncertainty. Neither the two-way inter-
action nor the three-way interaction were signifi-
cant, suggesting that each form of uncertainty
acts independently of the others on the decision
to vertically integrate.
Hypotheses 5a, 5b and 5c proposed another
series of interaction effects, i.e. that the extent to
which decision-makers take information about
each type of uncertainty into account will
strengthenthe relationships between the form of
uncertainty and vertical integration. These hypoth-
eses received mixed support. Whereas Hypotheses
5a and 5c weresupported(b = −0.47, p , 0.01
and b = 1.09, p , 0.01) respectively, Hypothesis
5b did not receive support (b = −0.09, n.s.). The
results indicate that primary uncertainty infor-
mation use strengthens the negative relationship
between primary uncertainty and vertical inte-
gration, and supplier uncertainty information use
strengthens the positive relationship between sup-
plier uncertainty and vertical integration.
As Table 2 indicates, none of the control vari-
ables were significant predictors of vertical inte-
gration at thep , 0.05 level.
DISCUSSION
A study of uncertainty and its effects on the
scope of the firm is timely in view of the sharply
increased environmental uncertainty of the current
economic and business context. Heightened busi-
ness and academic interest in ‘outsourcing’, or
vertical dis-integration (Quinn and Hilmer, 1994),
is evidence of the criticality of firm boundaries
as a means of transforming the organization to
deal with the new environment. Thus, as firms
seek to respond to the uncertainty in their
environments, one of the key decisions they face
is determining the degree of vertical scope that
best matches their competitive and strategic posi-
tions.
The purpose of the study reported here was to
empirically demonstrate the relative significance
of the different sources or forms of uncertainty



















Table 1. Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations
Variables Means S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Primary uncertainty 1.51 0.50 –
2. Competitive uncertainty 1.51 0.50−0.01 –
3. Behavioral uncertainty 1.51 0.50 0.01 −0.01 –
4. Primary uncertainty information use 4.14 1.00−0.01 0.01 0.02 –
5. Competitive uncertainty information use 4.29 1.48 0.02 0.12* 0.06 0.12* –
6. Supplier uncertainty information use 4.35 1.28 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.22** 0.10 –
7. Age 28.89 4.97 −0.02 0.04 0.13* −0.02 −0.06 0.00 –
8. Sex 1.66 0.48−0.00 0.03 0.04 −0.02 0.04 −0.11† 0.02 –
9. Total work experience 6.13 5.12 0.03 0.05 0.16** 0.02−0.13* −0.06 0.61** −0.05 –
10. Vertical integration 4.02 1.59−0.16** −0.19** 0.18** −0.07 0.03 0.11†−0.04 0.08 0.00 –
N = 308
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Table 2. Regression resultsa (N = 308): Dependent variable= vertical integration
Change
Beta R2 R2
Step 1 (Uncertainty) 0.09 0.09
Primary uncertainty (P) −0.39**
(0.156)
Competitive uncertainty (C) −0.32*
(0.158)
Supplier uncertainty (S) 0.53**
(0.158)
F = 9.66**
Step 2 (Uncertainty interactions) 0.10 0.01
P × C 0.07
(0.312)
P × S 0.13
(0.313)
C × S 0.39
(0.320)
P × C × S −0.92
(0.628)
F = 4.54**
Step 3 (Information use) 0.13 0.03
Primary uncertainty information use (PU) −0.11
(0.081)
Competitive uncertainty information use (CU) 0.05
(0.055)
Supplier uncertainty information use (SU) 0.02
(0.068)
F = 4.30**
Step 4 (Information use/uncertainty interactions) 0.30 0.16
P × PU −0.47**
(0.160)
C × CU −0.09
(0.109)
S × SU 1.08**
(0.133)
F = 10.44**





Total years experience −0.01
(0.016)
F = 8.80**
*p , 0.05; **p , 0.01
aAll beta weights are from final step in hierarchical regression. Standard errors are in parentheses.
results suggest not only that managers are able
to make distinctions among the three forms of
uncertainty proposed here, but also that these
three sources of uncertainty are differentially
related to the vertical integration decision. In
particular, the results may help clarify and resolve
 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J.,Vol. 19, 1–23 (1998)
some of the ambiguity in previous research about
the opposing effects of primary and competitive
uncertainty on the one hand, and supplier uncer-
tainty on the other, on the vertical scope of
the firm.
Most notably, the three sources of uncertainty
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appear to act independently of each other on
vertical integration (since we found no sta-
tistically significant interaction effects). These
results are important as they emphasize the need
to treat uncertainty as a distinct set of constructs,
rather than as an undifferentiated concept. In
addition, the results of this study suggest that
decision-makers, when using information about
primary and supplier uncertainty in their
decisions, act in a way that reinforces the effects
of these forms of uncertainty on vertical inte-
gration.
An important question to be asked, however,
is whether a global measure of uncertainty would
produce the same results. In order to provide
additional support for our conclusion, we conduc-
ted a post hoc analysis to see whether our results
would have been different had we used a ‘global’
uncertainty measure. First, we constructed a
‘global’ uncertainty measure by collapsing the
different uncertainty conditions into a single
index. Then we regressed the vertical integration
dependent variable on this global variable
(without interactions, information use and its
interactions, or controls).
The results were significantly different from
the results reported in Table 2. First, the overall
model was marginally significant (F = 2.96,
p , 0.09) and explained only 1 percent of the
variance. Second, the coefficient for the global
uncertainty measure was negative and marginally
significant (p , 0.09). Comparing those results
with the results reported in the paper, in which
we decomposed uncertainty into its subcomponent
parts, we find that the model tested in our study
is a significantly better fit to the data.
The finding that the propensity to vertically
integrate decreases asprimary uncertainty
increases is at odds withearly transaction cost
work suggesting that environmental uncertainty
is positively associated with vertical integration
(Williamson, 1975). More recently, however,
Williamson (1985) singles out behavioral uncer-
tainty as the main driver of vertical integration,
and suggests a positive relationship between
behavioral uncertainty and vertical integration, a
proposition that is consistent with our result
regarding supplier uncertainty.
Our findings are at odds with some studies in
the marketing channels literature that reveal a
positive link between volume uncertainty and
close vertical relationships, but are consistent with
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other studies in marketing that demonstrate a
positive association between behavioral uncer-
tainty and vertical integration. It is possible that
volume uncertainty in the context of downstream
distributor relationships reflects a narrower scope
of uncertainty, or a more controllable phenom-
enon than ours; whereas our constructs of primary
and competitive uncertainty reflect a broader,
more uncontrollable set of elements. Further,
echnological uncertainty forms part of our defi-
nition and operationalization of primary uncer-
tainty, and our results are consistent with previous
findings in this regard. Although speculative, our
results may suggest that firms opt against risky
investments in vertical integration capacity when
the macroenvironment is perceived as uncertain,
but decidefor vertical integration when the source
of uncertainty is more proximate or controllable.
While one may argue that the supplier firms
could equally pass on the costs of bearing the
uncertainty to the focal firms, suppliers are also
able to insulate themselves from the negative
ffects of primary and competitive uncertainty
by cumulating the demand from a number of
downstream firms.
As far as the research in the strategy field is
concerned, our findings broadly support empirical
work by Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt (1986) and
confirm the weak relationship in Harrigan (1985),
who found that firms are less likely to pursue
vertical integration as the level of technological
uncertainty increases. In addition to the trans-
action cost argument made by Balakrishnan and
Wernerfelt (1986)—that there may be lower prof-
its and therefore less to bargain over and save
by integrating in such contexts—other expla-
nations in this stream appear to hinge on main-
taining strategic flexibility. In fact, given the cur-
rent context of greatly increasing environmental
uncertainty including rapid changes in technology
and in demand conditions more generally, it is
possible that theactual relationship between pri-
mary uncertainty and firm scope has strengthened
and that earlier suggestive findings of Harrigan
(1985) would be even stronger today. Put differ-
ently, it may be that the need to stay flexible
and thereby limit the vertical scope of the firm
has become a much more compelling necessity
in today’s business environment, a trend which
would be consistent with our results.
The results of the study reported here also
show that managers are less likely to decide
Uncertainty in the Transaction Environment 15
to vertically integrate under conditions of high
competitive uncertaintyalthough we had hypothe-
sized the contrary. Competitive uncertainty in its
effects on firm decisions appears to behave in a
manner similar to primary uncertainty, at least
insofar as the test for our alternative hypothesis,
that of a negative relationship between primary
uncertainty and vertical integration, indicated. The
most straightforward explanation for this finding
is that managers prefer to limit vertical scope
when they have little information about the poten-
tial actions of competitors. Uncertainty about the
actions of competitors also may imply that future
supply conditions will be uncertain. This would
be true especially if competitors plan to expand
capacity and thereby preempt current and poten-
tial competitors (Dixit, 1980). Vertical integration
under conditions of competitive uncertainty may
restrict a firm’s strategic options by escalating
commitments to certain investments. Alterna-
tively, managers may consider the possibility that
competitors’ actions may be strategic (i.e.,
deceitful) and consequently decide to simplify the
boundaries of the firm until their understanding of
the situation becomes clearer. While competitive
uncertainty has a similar effect on vertical inte-
gration as primary uncertainty, the actions of
these two forms of uncertainty are, interestingly,
independent of each other, as the lack of inter-
action effects revealed. However, past studies
have not considered competitive uncertainty as
conceptually or operationally distinct from
environmental uncertainty in general.
The finding that vertical integration is more
likely when supplier uncertainty or supplier
behavioral uncertainty is high is consistent with
recent transaction cost research (e.g., John and
Weitz, 1988) and arguments suggesting that the
behavior of the exchange partner is a critical
determinant of the boundaries of the firm
(Williamson, 1985). While behavioral uncertainty
in terms of opportunism by the exchange partner
has so far been treated as a ‘given’ in the theory
and literature, some researchers (e.g., Dore, 1983)
question the assumption in regard to the oppor-
tunistic behavior of economic actors. Dore (1983)
argues that trusting behavior between economic
actors can be identified, which would suggest
that supplier (i.e., behavioral) uncertainty can be
reduced in a transaction context. Such an argu-
ment implies that it is possible to purposefully
reduce transaction costs between organizations by
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increasing the level of trust, thereby reducing
behavioral uncertainty and moving to more
efficient governance structures.
Finally, the results of this study shed some
light into strategic decision processes and how
information affects vertical integration decisions.
We found that vertical integration decisions are
affected not only by uncertainty type, but also
by the extent to which managers take information
related to uncertainty into account when making
their decision, although the main effects of the
xtent to which managers pay attention to differ-
ent types of information were not significant.
More interestingly, though, we found that the
extent to which managers consider information
about primary and supplier uncertainty signifi-
cantly moderates the relationships between pri-
mary and supplier uncertainty and vertical inte-
ration. This set of findings suggests that, in
general, what managers pay attention to matters
to their decision. In other words, paying attention
to information about primary and supplier uncer-
tainty influences their decision about vertical inte-
gration. Of course, we did not find a significant
coefficient for the interaction term between com-
petitive uncertainty and information use about this
form of uncertainty, which is an anomalous result.
The transaction cost perspective has been criti-
cized for ignoring the processes by which govern-
ance decisions are made. The results presented
here provide a preliminary step toward articulat-
ing the process by which managers use infor-
mation about uncertainty in making decisions
about firm boundaries.
Limitations
A possible limitation of this research relates to
external validity. This study used an experimental
design; thus, the external validity of our findings
may be questionable. However, we took some
precautions to decrease threats to external valid-
ity. First, our sample was composed of executives
and practising managers who are presumed to be
similar to the executives and other professionals
to whom the results may be generalized. Second,
significant care was taken in developing and test-
ing the decision scenarios in order to make sure
they were as realistic as possible. Our findings
seem to be consistent with more recent theoretical
and empirical treatments, which lends credence
to their validity.
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Although uncommon, scholars suggest that lab-
oratory research is particularly appropriate for
examining strategic phenomena that are not easily
accessible in the field. For example, Schwenk
(1995: 488) argues that laboratory studies may
be an especially effective method for examining
the ways environmental and organizational factors
affect decision processes because key informant
reports in the field are not always reliable
(Golden, 1992; Huber and Power, 1985). In the
study reported here, lack of control over the
environmental and information factors would have
seriously inhibited any effort to disentangle the
effects attributable to each of the three forms
of uncertainty.
It may also be fruitful to question the extent
to which it is meaningful to distinguish between
different categories of uncertainty, particularly
when they are defined in terms of different
sourcesof uncertainty. In fact, it could be argued
that the different sources of uncertainty are really
simply parts of acontinuumof uncertainty that
shade into one another. Such a continuum, as
mentioned earlier, would range from a completely
exogenous end, where there is little that a firm
can do to influence the course of events, to
increasingly endogenous parts. For example,
while regulatory change has been viewed as part
of primary uncertainty and the exogenous end of
the uncertainty continuum, the role of firms in
influencing the direction and scope of regulation
through lobbying and other efforts is not to be
underestimated (Hirsch, 1975; Lenway and
Rehbein, 1991). Thus, competitive actions can
lead to regulatory change, blurring the distinction
between primary and competitive uncertainty.
Similarly, actions of competitive firms can influ-
ence the pace and direction of technological
change. On the other hand, it makes sense to
theoretically and empirically make a distinction
between these types of uncertainty and supplier
uncertainty, whose effects on vertical scope tend
to be the opposite from those of primary and
competitive uncertainty.
Another possible limitation concerns the direc-
tionality of the uncertainty items used in the
decision scenarios. Some studies have shown that
decision processes and outcomes differ depending
on whether managers perceive they are
responding to problems or threats or responding
to opportunities (Fredrickson, 1985; Jackson and
Dutton, 1988). In fact, Jackson and Dutton (1988)
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found that managers are more sensitive to infor-
mation that suggests the presence of a threat and
have a tendency to interpret ambiguous infor-
mation in threat terms. In order to prevent the
confounding of our results related to the framing
of environmental contingencies, it was important
to develop certainty–uncertainty items that simply
reflected the level of certainty–uncertainty and
were free of positive or negative connotations.
Surprisingly, this task was much more difficult
than we had imagined. Nonetheless, careful atten-
tion to the issue of directionality resulted in
uncertainty passages that are relatively free from
any positive–negative directionality (see Appen-
dix 2). Thus, we are reasonably confident that
we have avoided any confounding of our results
related to directionality or framing.
The results reported in this study raise other
questions. Organizational environments are
becoming increasingly complex, qualitatively
more demanding, ill defined, contradictory, and
dynamic. It is possible that the results reflect
recognition of this change in organizational
environments and a tendency to favor flexibility
and the implied reduction in firm scope. In other
words, it may be that subjects emphatically indi-
cated their preferences for smaller firms in the
face of the uncertainty of the general environ-
ment.
Future directions
This study highlights several areas for extending
and enhancing current research. One important
avenue for future research concerns the relation-
ships among environmental uncertainty, mana-
gerial perceptions, and objectively measured attri-
butes of the environment (e.g., Sutcliffe, 1994),
and assessing the effects of objective vs. percep-
tually measured uncertainty on vertical scope and
other strategic decisions. Field researchers study-
ing the link between environmental uncertainty
and organizational adaptations have adopted one
of two approaches (Yasai-Ardekani, 1986). Some
researchers have focused their efforts on examin-
ing the link between objective environmental
uncertainty and organizational responses or struc-
tural adaptations (e.g., Balakrishnan and Werner-
f lt, 1986; Child, 1972; Keats and Hitt, 1988).
Other researchers have focused their efforts on
examining the link betweenperceived environ-
mental uncertainty and organizational adaptations
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(e.g., Duncan, 1972; Miles and Snow, 1978).
Given that top managers’ perceptions of the
environment are a significant determinant of an
organization’s strategy and design (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978), it seems reasonable to argue that
vertical integration decisions are likely to be
based upon top managers’perceptionsof uncer-
tainty. While the transaction cost literature has
not directly addressed the issue of which environ-
mental construct—objective or perceived—
underlies vertical integration decisions, the theory
seems to imply that it is perceptual, rather than
objective uncertainty that drives the decision
about firm boundaries. Specifically, it is not so
much that firms’ environments are uncertain, but,
more importantly, that managers view the
environment as uncertainand act on their percep-
tions. Of course, organizational outcomes
(performance) may be influenced by parts of
the environment not considered or ignored by
decision-makers.
In order to better understand vertical integration
decision processes it may be necessary to employ
richer methods and longitudinal designs. For
example, studies linking the cognitive maps of
dominant coalitions in the same industry over
time with descriptive data on the environmental
context also may provide fruitful insights into
how managers operationally think of their
environments and act on them (Fahey and Naray-
anan, 1989). Research in this vein also may
provide additional insights into the environmental
information that is relevant for organizational suc-
cess and may be useful for understanding why
some important environmental information is
rejected, considered irrelevant, or unimportant,
or why unimportant information is considered
meaningful, relevant, and important (Sutcliffe,
1997).
The findings reported here—especially the link
between supplier uncertainty and the decision
about firm boundaries—raise other questions. In
particular, on the surface, supplier uncertainty
(i.e., behavioral) appears to have a close relation-
ship with trust. Thus, the absence of behavioral
uncertainty can be quite easily equated with the
existence of trust between the partners in a
relationship. In fact, reliability and predictability
are two commonly accepted dimensions of the
trust construct (Rempel, Holmes, and Zanna,
1985). These are clearly the obverse of
‘behavioral uncertainty’ on the part of the
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exchange partner. In fact, recent theoretical treat-
ments have questioned the assumption of oppor-
tunism in transaction cost theory (Bromiley and
Cummings, 1995) which suggests new directions
in the structuring of organizations and of inter-
organizational relationships. However the role,
antecedents, and outcomes of the absence of
opportunism—trust—in interorganizational ties
have yet to be explored in depth, although some
empirical beginnings have been made (Zaheer
and Venkatraman, 1995). Further empirical
research into these questions will serve to sharpen
our conceptions about the related constructs of
uncertainty and trust.
In summary, the combined results suggest that
more work needs to be done in a number of
related areas. Specifically, we need to conduct
research that more accurately reflects how
decision-makers select the type of information
they use in making strategic decisions about
organizational boundaries, the relationship of this
information with objective reality and with
decisions regarding firm scope, and a better
understanding of the links between supplier
uncertainty and trust and their antecedents.
Concluding remarks
The relationship between uncertainty and vertical
firm scope has been ambiguous in empirical and
theoretical treatments. This study tries to resolve
the ambiguity by explicitly considering the differ-
ent sources of uncertainty and their simultaneous
effects on decisions regarding vertical scope.
Hypotheses are tested in an experimental setting
on practicing managers with different decision
scenarios. The findings suggest that, contrary to
theory, two major types of uncertainty tend to
reduce rather than increase decisions about firm
vertical scope, whereas supplier uncertainty, as
hypothesized, indeed results in decisions to
i crease firm scope. The findings also shed some
light on the process of decision-making about
firm governance and highlight the instrumental
effects of information in affecting decisions. Field
t sts of the ideas presented here will undoubtedly
enhance our understanding of uncertainty, its
forms, and its differential effects on strategic
decisions.
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APPENDIX 1: Decision Scenario#1
(High Primary, Competitive, Supplier
Uncertainty)
Vegas Press
You are the President of Vegas Press, a company
in the book publishing industry. You have been at
Vegas Press for 22 years, working your way up
through the ranks to the presidency which you
assumed three years ago. You are well respected
by your colleagues in the firm and in the industry.
The management at Vegas Press is faced with
a decision on how to improve the company’s
finishing operations. The Vice President (VP) of
Manufacturing has recently submitted a proposal
supporting the outsourcing of finishing operations.
At the same time, you have received a report
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from the VP of Finishing Operations proposing
cost effective improvements in current hard bind-
ing and folding operations.
As President of Vegas Press, you must decide
which plan to adopt. Below is some information
about the company, the industry, and the economy
in general.
The company
Vegas Press, located in Las Vegas, is a medium-
sized company specializing in computer manuals.
The company was founded in 1947 by Sterling
Rule. At that time Sterling was a furniture retailer
in Naperville, about 25 miles south of downtown
Chicago. As the recession of 1940s took a toll
on his business, he liquidated what was left,
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looked for a change of scene, and moved the
family to Las Vegas on April Fool’s Day.
The move did not solve Rule’s problem of
what to do with the rest of his life. While con-
sidering his alternatives, he completed a six-week
course in card-dealing and went to work in a
casino. He quickly decided that working as an
employee in the gambling halls was not for him.
His entrepreneurial spirit was rekindled after a
chance meeting with a businessman running a
printing outfit. When Sterling realized that there
was quite a demand for certain specializing bind-
ing operations, he used the proceeds from the
sale of his furniture store to purchase binding
machines, and established a small binding com-
pany he called Vegas Press in honor of his
new home.
Tom Rule, Sterling’s son, joined the company
in 1962 after graduating in Printing Technology.
After working for several years in various depart-
ments of the company, Tom assumed the Presi-
dency of Vegas Press in 1972, while Sterling
became Chairman of the Board. When Sterling
retired three years ago, Tom succeeded him as
Chairman and you moved up to the Presidency.
The business grew slowly during the early
years. With the advent of the baby boom and the
economic expansion of the 1950s, the firm began
to grow more rapidly to keep up with the demand.
In the late Sixties, the company expanded its
operations by purchasing two small but well
established printing presses and acquired their
extensive prepress and press operations. The firm
steadily grew through the Seventies. As the
demand for computers burgeoned in the Eighties,
Tom focused the company’s operations on the
accompanying manuals for the machines and
the software.
The book publishing and printing industry
Publishers serve an array of business, consumer,
educational, and institutional markets. Shipments
of U.S. books to these markets totaled
$14.7 billion in 1991. While the U.S. has about
20,000 firms that publish sporadically, a core
group of about 2,000 companies consistently pub-
lish four or more book titles annually. Marketing
and administrative costs are high in this industry.
Therefore, despite a high gross profit margin, the
operating profit is, on average, low.
There are three distinct operations in the book
 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J.,Vol. 19, 1–23 (1998)
publishing and printing business—prepress, press,
and finishing. Prepress and press operations
involve editing, composing, proof reading, and
printing. Finishing operations involve diecutting,
foil stamping, stitching, trimming, and more. All
three sets of operations have to be coordinated
in order to run efficiently.
The demand for books depends on a number
of factors. During economic downturns, customers
sometimes cancel or cut back their existing
orders. This leaves publishers in the difficult posi-
tion of having to make painful cutbacks to their
operations. Conversely, in boom times, orders
tend to pour in and quick adjustments have to
be made to meet the increased demand. Flexibility
and customer responsiveness are the key determi-
nants of competitive advantage in the industry.
Since there are as many as 2,000 companies
forming the core group of publishing activities,
there is intense competition in this industry. Due
to the relatively low capital requirements how-
ever, there are neither significant barriers to the
entry of firms nor to their exit.
The economy
Although the industry declined in 1991 due to
the general recession, some analysts project that
a recovered U.S. economy should raise book
publishing shipments in 1994. On the other hand,
other industry observers suggest that there will
be continued weakness in the economy which
could negatively affect demand in the book pub-
lishing industry. In spite of the increased growth
rate in GDP, economists are not certain about
future interest rates, inflation, and levels of unem-
ployment. Thus, all in all, analysts seem very
uncertain about an economic recovery.
The public’s hopes for economic recovery also
have remained unchanged even after the new
administration announced its economic program.
Analysts are also unsure how the new adminis-
ration might change industry regulations. Some
speculate that an environment-conscious adminis-
ration may impose new restrictions on the paper
used by the industry and mandate a minimum
recycled portion. In contrast, other industry lobby-
ists predict that the new government may impose
regulations to protect the printing and publishing
industries from imported books, which although
limited in overall volume, represent a significant
proportion of the market in certain specialized
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areas. However, no one really knows how regula-
tory changes will affect the industry.
The performance of Vegas Press
Vegas Press is a medium-sized company with
annual sales of $5 million. Over its 46 years the
company has generally been able to maintain its
profitability level at the industry average. Sales
have been growing at around 4% per year, again
about average for the industry.
Over time, the company has invested in mod-
ernizing its prepress and press equipment to keep
up with technological advances in these areas.
Although many technological strides have been
made in the bindery end of the industry in the
past few years, there is much uncertainty as to
whether the rate and direction of technological
change will continue.
The decision facing Vegas Press
Vegas Press is faced with a decision either to
outsource its finishing operations to Flamingo
Binders—a local binding company that special-
izes in binding computer manuals—or to pur-
chase and install new, state-of-the-art binding
machinery in-house.
The binding equipment currently in use at
Vegas Press consists of hard binding and folding
machines, which are aging and run at full
capacity. This constrains the prepress and press
machines which have to be kept idle in order to
adjust to the speed of production of the binding
equipment; otherwise, large in-process inventories
build up.
Investing in binding machinery may improve
finishing operations by increasing throughput as
the VP of Finishing suggests. However, the
Manufacturing VP has been holding discussions
with local binders, and has proposed that the
finishing operations be completely outsourced to
Flamingo. Flamingo has recently installed special-
ized polyurethane adhesive (PUR) technology and
therefore can meet the strict quality standards for
the computer manuals required by Vegas Press’
customers. Flamingo, however, has made it clear
that they will be unable to offer such attractive
rates unless they are given responsibility for the
entire finishing operation. While in the past Fla-
mingo has generally been able to meet its contrac-
tual obligations with Vegas, once about three
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years ago when Flamingo was overwhelmed with
orders, it let Vegas down badly.
In case operations are outsourced, some modi-
fication of Vegas’ processes and equipment will
be required to assure that the output from printing
is compatible with the requirements of Flamingo’s
finishing operations. The investment required
would be moderate.
It is estimated that the total investment required
for the new binding machinery is approximately
$800,000. If the growth rate of Vegas can be
maintained at the existing level of 4% for the
next 7 years, the investment will produce a posi-
tive return. The future demand for Vegas’ prod-
ucts is highly uncertain. If low demand pro-
jections become a reality, then outsourcing will
become advantageous since production can be cut
without worrying about carrying excess capacity
in finishing operations. However, if instead actual
demand is closer to high estimates, in-house fin-
ishing operations will become more attractive due
to economies of scale, assuming that other factors
remain unchanged.
Jerry Fernandez, the proprietor of Flamingo,
was a good friend of Sterling Rule, and maintains
a close relationship with Tom. However, Jerry is
expected to retire in six months and will give
full charge of the company to his son Matthew.
People close to Matthew are very unsure about
Matthew’s plans for Flamingo’s business relation-
ships.
There are strong rumors in the marketplace
that a major competitor has firmed up plans to
add more binding capacity to its finishing line.
Some competitors may be considering upgrading
their binding equipment. Similar rumors have
proved false in the past. However, if true, there
may be excess binding capacity in the market,
which could lead to price wars and losses for
some publishers.
While some companies in the industry do
everything in-house, others are known to out-
source as much as possible. Industry observers
are divided as to whether publishers should con-
centrate on prepress and press activities and out-
source the binding operations or should build in-
house finishing capacity to achieve economic
efficiencies.
You have been asked by Tom Rule to evaluate
the pros and cons of the two alternatives for
improving the finishing operations. As the Presi-
dent of Vegas Press, you know that you should
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look beyond the financial attractiveness of the
alternatives before making a decision.
APPENDIX 2: Scenario passages
reflecting the three types of uncertainty
and items used to assess information use
Primary uncertainty
Low
Although the industry declined in 1991 due to
the general recession, new projections suggest
that a recovered U.S. economy should raise book
publishing shipments in 1994. In fact, analysts
are very certain about economic recovery. Since
the unemployment rate is down and personal
income has grown slightly with the increased
growth rate in GDP, economists generally agree
that inflation and levels of unemployment will
be controlled.
Analysts also predict that the new adminis-
tration may impose industry regulations. There
is a broad consensus among political observers,
however, that the book publishing industry will
be one of the few industries to come out even
from the actions of the new government.
Over time, the company has invested in mod-
ernizing its prepress and press equipment to keep
up with technological advances in these areas. It
is expected that only minor technological changes
will occur steadily in the coming years, and these
changes are not expected to materially affect
plant efficiency.
The Manufacturing VP is quite certain that
future demand will match or exceed current lev-
els.
High
Although the industry declined in 1991 due to
the general recession, some analysts project that
a recovered U.S. economy should raise book
publishing shipments in 1994. On the other hand,
other industry observers suggest that there will
be continued weakness in the economy which
could negatively affect demand in the book pub-
lishing industry. In spite of the increased growth
rate in GDP, economists are not certain about
future interest rates, inflation, and levels of unem-
ployment. Thus, all in all, analysts seem very
uncertain about an economic recovery.
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Analysts are also unsure how the new adminis-
tration might change industry regulations. Some
speculate that an environment-conscious adminis-
tration may impose new restrictions on the paper
used by the industry and mandate a minimum
recycled portion. In contrast, other industry lobby-
ists predict that the new government may impose
regulations to protect the printing and publishing
industries from imported books, which although
limited in overall volume, represent a significant
proportion of the market in certain specialized
areas. However, no one really knows how regula-
tory changes will affect the industry.
Over time, the company has invested in mod-
ernizing its prepress and press equipment to keep
up with technological advances in these areas.
Although many technological strides have been
made in the bindery end of the industry in the
past few years, there is much uncertainty as to
whether the rate and direction of technological
change will continue.




You meet frequently with your counterparts from
other publishing companies and are certain they
will not add to their capacity in any significant
way. Further, no one expects any new firms to
nter the computer manual niche.
High
There are strong rumors in the marketplace that
a major competitor has firmed up plans to add
more binding capacity to its finishing line. Some
competitors may be considering upgrading their
binding equipment. Similar rumors have proved
false in the past. However, if true, there may be
excess binding capacity in the market, which
could lead to price wars for some publishers.
Supplier uncertainty
Low
In the past, Vegas Press has outsourced some of
its binding operations during peak demand to
Flamingo and has been quite satisfied with the
quality of the job and the timeliness of delivery.
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Jerry Fernandez, the proprietor of Flamingo,
was a good friend of Sterling Rule, and maintains
a close relationship with Tom. However, Jerry is
expected to retire in six months and will give
full charge of the company to his son Matthew.
Everyone close to Matthew concurs that he will
continue to deal fairly with Vegas Press, like
his father.
High
While in the past Flamingo has generally been
able to meets its contractual obligations with
Vegas, once about three years ago when Flamingo
was overwhelmed with orders, it let Vegas
down badly.
Jerry Fernandez, the proprietor of Flamingo,
was a good friend of Sterling Rule, and maintains
a close relationship with Tom. However, Jerry is
expected to retire in six months and will give
full charge of the company to his son Matthew.
People close to Matthew are very unsure about
Matthew’s plans for Flamingo’s business relation-
ships.
Specific items used to measure the extent of
information use are listed below.
Low uncertainty information items
1. New projections suggest that a recovered U.S.
economy should raise book publishing ship-
ments in 1994.
2. Analysts are very certain about economic
recovery.
3. There is a broad consensus among political
observers that the book publishing industry
will be one of the few industries to come out
even from the actions of the new government.
4. The pace of technological change is expected
to continue, but changes are not expected to
materially affect plant efficiency.
5. Future demand will match or exceed current
levels.
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6. You meet frequently with your counterparts
from other publishing companies and are cer-
tain they will not add to their capacity in any
significant way. Further, no one expects any
new firms to enter the computer manual niche.
7. In the past, Vegas Press has outsourced some
of its binding operations during peak demand
to Flamingo and has been quite satisfied with
the quality of the job and the timeliness of
delivery.
High uncertainty information items
1. Some analysts project that a recovered U.S.
economy should raise book publishing ship-
ments in 1994. On the other hand, other indus-
try observers suggest that there will be con-
tinued weakness in the economy which could
negatively affect demand in the book pub-
lishing industry.
2. Economists are not certain about future interest
rates, inflation, and levels of unemployment.
3. No one really knows how regulatory changes
will affect the industry.
4. The future demand for Vegas’ products is
highly uncertain.
5. Many technological strides have been made in
the bindery end of the industry in the past
few years, there is much uncertainty as to
whether the rate and direction of technological
change will continue.
6. There are strong rumors in the marketplace
that a major competitor has firmed up plans
to add more binding capacity to its finishing
line. Some competitors may be considering
upgrading their binding equipment. Similar
rumors have proved false in the past.
7. While in the past Flamingo has generally been
able to meet its contractual obligations with
Vegas, once about three years ago when Fla-
mingo was overwhelmed with orders, it let
Vegas down badly.
